Dynamic Epistemic Logic makes it possible to model and reason about information change in multi-agent systems. Information change is mathematically modeled through epistemic action Kripke models introduced by Baltag et al. Also, van Ditmarsch interprets the information change as a relation between epistemic states and sets of epistemic states and to describe it formally, he considers a special constructor L B called learning operator. Inspired by this, it seems natural to us that the basic source of information change in a multi-agent system should be learning an announcement by some agents together, privately, concurrently or even wrongly. Hence moving along this path, we introduce the notion of a learning program and prove that all finite K45 action models can be described by our learning programs.
Introduction
A computable function over strings of a finite alphabet is a function that can be computed by a Turing machine. A Turing machine takes a string as input, performs a sequence of elementary changes on the string and if it halts, it provides another string as output of the function. In recursion theory all Turing computable function can be obtained via some initial functions: zero, successor, and projections through applying some basic operations such as composition, primitive recursion and least search. In this paper, our goal is to develop a similar methodology for a class of epistemic functions. Following the same terminology, an epistemic function is a function that takes the epistemic state of a multi-agent system as input and yields a new epistemic state as output. The notion of epistemic function is the focus of Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Baltag et al. [4, 5] , and is formalized in action models. These functions act on Kripke models via an update operator and produce an update Kripke model. In this paper, we concentrate on those epistemic functions which can be coded as K45 action models. K45 models are those models which accessibly relations transitive and Euclidian. We claim that there are possible information changes which are not possible to encode them by KD45 or S5 action models. Consequently K45 action models are more powerful to describe epistemic functions than KD45 and S5 action models. It is why we consider K45 action models instead of S5 or KD45 models.
So far no one has looked at it from a computational aspect to answer the following question what are the initial functions and the basic operations by which all K45 epistemic functions can be obtained?
The basic source of information change in a multi-agent system is learning an announcement by some agents together, privately, concurrently or even wrongly. So the basic operators should be different kinds of learning. Van Ditmarsch et al. introduced a learning constructor in [7, 8] . We define our own learning operator which is different from van Ditmarsch's.
As our initial functions, we take the test of any facts ϕ, that is ?ϕ. For the basic operations, we take the following different kinds of learning: 1-alternative learning, 2-concurrent learning, 3-wrong learning, and finally, 4-recursive learning. Following the footsteps of recursion theory, we prove that all epistemic functions can be obtained through the test of facts by applying the above four basic operations.
Epistemic logic, started with Hintikka's groundwork [14] , models and reasons about the knowledge of agents in a group [12] . In Epistemic logic, the notions of knowledge and belief are modeled in terms of the possible worlds (states). An agent knows or believes a fact if it is true in all the worlds that the agent considers possible as alternatives for the actual world.
As information is transmitted, knowledge and belief of agents in a multi-agent system may change. The simplest cause for an information change is to announce some truth in public. Plaza in 1989 [15] , introduced a logic to formalize these changes and called it the public announcement logic. In public announcement logic, a fact is publicly announced in a multi-agent system and all agents together update their knowledge and belief. However, more complex actions than such as private or dishonest announcements may occur, this is whereby different agents may have different views on some action [4, 5, 7] , or the announcement may not be truthful.
Our work may be considered as a bridge between two paradigms in dynamic epistemic logic, namely Baltag et al. style action model and van Ditmarsch et al. epistemic actions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we recall the definition of action models from [4] , and we explain what it means that a group of agents learns an action model. We discuss K45 Kripke models which only have transitive and Euclidian properties. We also introduce a new notion called the applicable formulas, and restrict the definition of satisfaction relation only to applicable formulas.
In section 3, we introduce the initial functions and basic operations as the building blocks of the finite epistemic functions.
In section 4, we add the new operator of recursion in constructing the finite epistemic functions.
Finally, in section 5, we compare our work with other related works, and further works may be done.
Backgrounds
In this section, we introduce two significant notion: 1-learning an action model, 2-K45 Kripke models and applicable formulas.
Action models
We start by recalling the definition of an action model from Baltag [4] . A pointed action model (N, s 0 ) is a tuple N = S, ( a ) a∈A , pre , where S is a set of events, A is a set of agents, a is an accessibility relation for agent a on events in S, and pre is a function that assigns to each event, a formula of an appropriate epistemic language, as a precondition for that event. s 0 ∈ S is called the actual event.
Announcements of facts in multi-agent systems give rises to information changes, where different agents have different access to the resource of the announcement, and also different views about the access of other agents to the resource.
For instance, consider the pointed action model (N 1 , s) in Figure 1 , where S = {s, t}, s a t, t a t, pre(s) = ϕ, pre(t) = ψ.
Figure 1
Here (N 1 , s) encodes the following information change " ϕ is announced whereas agent a (wrongly) learns ψ."
One may assume that ϕ = green and ψ = blue, are two different colors. Then the action model (N 1 , s) says that a green ball is shown to a, whereas agent a thinks that she sees a blue ball.
Consider the pointed model (N 2 , s) in Figure 2 , where S = {s, t}, s b s, s a t, t a t, pre(s) = ϕ and pre(t) = ψ.
Figure 2
This action model encodes the following information change: "a green ball is shown to agents a and b, agent b sees a green ball and is aware that agent a has a color-blindness and sees a blue ball. Agent a just sees a blue ball and has no idea about what b sees".
Remark 2.1
The word "having no idea" used above is vague, and needs to be clarified. In the action model N 1 , agent b is not present in the state t. So agent a has no idea about the information of agent b. There could be lots of possibilities about the color-blindness of b at state t, but the action model says nothing about it. We will later introduce the notion of applicable formulas (see Definition 2.7) to formally model this case.
For another example, consider the pointed model (N 3 , s) in Figure 3 , where S = {s, t}, s b s, t b s s a t, t a t, pre(s) = ϕ and pre(t) = ψ. The action model (N 3 , s) encodes the information change that "a green ball is shown to agents a and b, agent b sees a green ball and is aware that agent a has a color-blindness and sees a blue ball. Agent a sees a blue ball and wrongly thinks that agent b has a color-blindness and sees a green ball. Moreover, both agents are aware about each other's thoughts".
According to the above discussion, a pointed action model (N, s), where N = S, ( a ) a∈A , pre , encodes the information change that the fact pre(s) is announced whereas each agent (relevant to its accessibility relation in the action model) acquires information of what may have been announced and what other agents may have heard.
Learning an Action Model
We should also clarify what it means that a group of agents learns an action model. Suppose (N, s) is a pointed action model, and B is a group of agents. The case that "group B learns (N, s)", is a new action model which encodes the following information change "the fact pre(s) is announced and group B learns the fact pre(s) and the information that other agents (excluding B) acquires due to learning (N, s)".
For example, recall the pointed action model (N 1 , s) in Figure 1 , where it encodes the following information change "ϕ is announced whereas agent a (wrongly) learns ψ".
An agent b learns (N 1 , s) means "ϕ is announced and agent b learns that ϕ is announced and the fact that agent a (wrongly) learns ψ. Agent a still wrongly learns ψ and has no idea about what b learns".
The case that agent b learns (N 1 , s), denoted by L b ((N 1 , s) ), is encoded by the pointed action model (N 2 , s) in Figure 2 .
Four different kinds of learning, in a multi-agent system, may be distinguished:
1. Alternative Learning: a group of agents, B, together learns that among a set of Figure 1 , and (M 2 , s 2 ) be another pointed action model, in which
Then the pointed action model of (M 1 , s 1 ) ∩ (M 2 , s 2 ) would be Figure 5 See Definition 3.2 for details.
3. Wrong Learning: whereas a fact ψ is announced, a group of agents, B, wrongly learns something else. Figure 3 . 
Epistemic Logic
In this section we briefly go through the syntax and semantics of epistemic logic. The syntax of epistemic logic is as usual, but the semantics is a little bit different from the standard one.
Definition 2.6 Let P be a non-empty set of propositional variables, and A be a set of agents. The language L(A, P ) is the smallest superset of P such that
For i ∈ A, K i ϕ has to be read as 'agent i believes (knows) ϕ". For a group of agents B ⊆ A, K B ϕ means that K i ϕ, for all i ∈ B.
Epistemic logic models the notions of knowledge and belief in terms of the notion of possible worlds in Kripke semantics. Definition 2.7 A Kripke model M is a tuple M = S, ( i ) i∈A , V , where S is a nonempty set of worlds (states) s ∈ S, V is a function from P to 2 S , and each i is a binary accessibility relation between worlds. We define the group present at the state (M, s) as follows:
For an epistemic state (M, s), the set of applicable formulas at the state (M, s), denoted by Φ (M,s) ⊆ L(A, P ), is the smallest subset satisfying the following conditions s) ) and for all t such that s i t, ϕ ∈ Φ (M,t) .
Intuitively, the applicable formulas of an epistemic state, are those formulas that can sensibly be assigned a truth value. For example, consider the Kripke model in Figure 6 . Figure 6 As agent b is not present in the world t, formulas like K b χ are not applicable in the world t (it is not possible to talk about the truth of K b χ in world t, where agent b is not present in this world). Also the formula
is not applicable at the world s. In the next definition, we restrict the definition of truth to applicable formulas.
Definition 2.8 In order to determine whether an applicable formula ϕ ∈ Φ (M,s) is true in the epistemic state (M, s), denoted by (M, s) |= ϕ, we look at the structure of ϕ:
Note that the satisfaction relation is just defined for applicable formulas. The standard epistemic logic S5 consists of axioms A1 − A5 and the derivation rules R1 and R2 given below
If instead of A3, we assume the weaker axiom D (given below), the logic of belief KD45 will be specified.
Definition 2.9 Let M = S, ( a ) a∈A , V be a Kripke model. For each a ∈ A, we say that the relation a is 1) reflexive if and only if for all s ∈ S, s a s;
2) serial if and only if for all s ∈ S, there exists t ∈ S such that s a t;
3) transitive if and only if for all s, t, u ∈ S, if s a t and t a u then s a u; 4) Euclidean if and only if for all three states s, t, u ∈ S if s a t and s a u then t a u.
We say a relation a is
• S5 whenever it is reflexive, transitive and Euclidean,
• KD45 whenever it is serial, transitive and Euclidean, and
• K45 whenever it is transitive and Euclidean. Figure 2 is K45. Definition 2.10 Let P be a set of atomic formulas, A be a set of agents, and Φ be a set of epistemic formulas over atomic formulas P and agents in A.
We use FAct(Φ) (or simply FAct) to refer to the set of all pointed epistemic action models (N, t) such that N is a finite K45 model, and the image of pre is Φ.
We use Mod(A, P ) (or simply Mod) to refer to the set of all epistemic states (M, s) such that M is K45.
We recall definition of bisimulation of actions from [9] . Consider two action models N = S, ( a ) a∈A , pre and N = S , ( a ) a∈A , pre . The pointed action model (N, s) is bisimilar to (N , s ), denoted by (N, s) (N , s ), whenever there is a relation R ⊆ S × S satisfying the following conditions, for each agent a ∈ A:
Initial. R(s, s ).
Forth. If R(t, t ) and t a v, then there is a v ∈ S such that R(v, v ) and t a v .
Back. If R(t, t ) and t a v , then there is a v ∈ S such that R(v, v ) and t a v.
Pre. If R(t, t ), then pre(t) is equivalent to pre(t ) in KD45 belief logic.
We define another notion of equivalence on action models and call it agent-bisimulation.
Definition 2.11 Let a ∈ A be an arbitrary agent. Two pointed action models (N, s) and (N , s ) are a-bisimilar whenever Forth. If s a t, then there is a t ∈ S such that s a t and (N, t) (N , t ).
Back. If s a t , then there is a t ∈ S such that s a t and (N, t) (N , t ).
The execution of a pointed action model (N, t) ∈ FAct on an epistemic state (M, s) ∈ Mod is a new epistemic state (M * N, (s, t)), where M * N = S, ( i ) i∈A , V and
Proof. It is straightforward.
Why K45 Models and Applicable Formulas?
K45 Kripke models are more general than KD45 models, as they necessarily do not have the serial property. The reason that we consider serial property for KD45 model is that, we want the agent's belief to be consistent. For K45 Kripke models, we consider the definition of satisfaction relation just for applicable formulas. In this way, the agent's beliefs are consistent at each state. Moreover, regarding applicable formulas, the class of K45 models is a (sound and complete) semantics for logic of belief KD45.
Assume that a formula ϕ is derivable from the logic of belief, i.e., KD45 ϕ. Then for every K45 pointed model (M, s), if ϕ is applicable at this state, then (M, s) |= ϕ. Also, note that every KD45 model is also a K45 model. So for any formula ϕ, if for all K45 pointed model (M, s) which ϕ is applicable at the state, we have (M, s) |= ϕ then KD45 ϕ.
Since K45 models are more general than KD45 models, we can encode more epistemic functions in K45 models, as we do not have to determine the cases where an agent does not have any idea about the belief of another agent. For example, consider the following information change: a green ball is shown to agents a and b, agent b sees a green ball and is aware that agent a has a color-blindness and sees a blue ball. Agent a just sees a blue ball and has no idea about what b sees.
In the above information change, agent a has no idea about what b sees. Agent a says I do not have any idea, there could be lots of possibilities and I do not know even how many possibilities exist, may be an infinite number of them. It would be possible that agent b sees a cube instead of a ball, or even an elephant, and etc. It would be possible that agent b sees the ball in a color which is unknown for me.
In KD45 models, we are forced to encode all possibilities, but if it happens that some possibilities are unknown, then we don't know what to do. However such information change can be encoded by the K45 action model in figure 2 .
Therefore, considering applicable formulas, the class of K45 models is still a semantics for logic of belief (similar to the class of KD45 models) and moreover, they are enough general than KD45 models for describing information changes formally.
Basic Learning Programs
As mentioned in the introduction, our goal is to introduce some initial functions and basic operators as the building blocks of all finite epistemic functions (FAct). In this section, we introduce the first class of epistemic learning programs, called basic learning programs. The reason these are called basic is that they do not include any recursion in their structure.
Definition 3.1 Let Φ be a set of epistemic formulas over a set of atomic formulas P and a set of agents A. The set of basic learning programs BLP(Φ) is defined as follows:
i. Test. for all ϕ ∈ Φ, ?ϕ is a basic learning program, and we define group(?ϕ) = ∅, and pre(?ϕ) = ϕ,
ii. Alternative Learning. for all n ∈ N, and B ⊆ A, if α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n are basic learning programs, then L B (α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n ) is a basic learning program, and we define
iii. Concurrent Learning. if α 1 , α 2 are basic learning programs such that pre(
iv. Wrong Learning. if α 1 is a basic learning program and ψ is an epistemic formula, then ψ| B α 1 is a basic learning program whenever B ⊆ group(α 1 ). We define group(ψ| B α 1 ) = B and pre(ψ| B α 1 ) = ψ.
To each basic learning program, we associate a pointed action model as follows.
Definition 3.2 Semantics of BLP.
1. for all ϕ ∈ Φ, the pointed action model of the program ?ϕ, is (N ?ϕ , s ?ϕ ), where
in which for all a ∈ A, a = ∅ and pre(s ?ϕ ) = ϕ.
2. Suppose α 1 , α 2 , ..., α k are basic learning programs and their associated action models
Then the associated action model to the basic learning program
The associated action model of L B (α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n ) means: pre(α 1 ) is announced whereas agents in B learn that either α 1 or α 2 or ... or α k has been executed, and what other agents learn in each alternative case.
3. Suppose α 1 , α 2 are basic learning programs and their associated action models are (N 1 , s 1 ) and (N 2 , s 2 ) respectively, where
Then the pointed action model of the basic learning program α 1 ∩ α 2 is (N, s) with N = S, ( a ) a∈A , pre , where
The associated action model of α 1 ∩ α 2 means: pre(α 1 ) is announced whereas agents in group(α 1 ) learn according to execution of α 1 , agents in group(α 2 ) learn according to execution of α 2 .
Suppose α is a basic learning program and its associated action model is
where
Then the associated action model of ψ| B α is (N, s) with N = S, ( a ) a∈A , pre , where
The associated action model of ψ| B α 1 means: ψ is announced whereas agents in group B wrongly learn according to execution of α 1 .
The action model of a program α is denoted by (N α , s α ). An epistemic action (N, t) ∈ FAct(Φ) is called basic learning action whenever there is a basic learning programs α ∈ BLP(Φ) such that (N α , s α ) is bisimilar to (N, t). 
is bisimilar to the action model illustrated in Figure 2 . The action model illustrated in Figure 4 is a basic learning action. It is bisimilar to the action model associated with the basic learning program
Also, the action model associated with the basic learning program
is bisimilar with the action model illustrated in Figure 5 .
• An S5 submodel of N is an S5 action model M = S , ( a ) a∈B , pre , where S ⊆ S, pre = pre| S , B ⊆ A and for all a ∈ B, a = a | S . An S5 submodel is called connected whenever all two different states of the model are reachable from each other. It is called closed whenever for all s, t ∈ S, if s ∈ S and for some a ∈ B, s a t, then t ∈ S .
• Let M = S , ( a ) a∈B , pre and M = S , ( a ) a∈C , pre be two closed connected S5 action submodels of N . We write M ≤ M whenever S ⊆ S and B ⊆ C. One may easily verify that ≤ is a partial order relation.
•
submodel of N with respect to the partial order relation ≤. We construct the action model T (N ) = S , ( a ) a∈A , pre as follows:
-(s, i) a (t, j) if and only if either i = j and s i a t, or i = j, a ∈ B i , a ∈ B j , and s a t (in the action model N ).
-pre ((s, i)) = pre i (s).
• The projection of a state (s, i) in the action model T (N ), denoted by Π((s, i)), is defined to be the state s in the action model N .
• For the action model N , we define the directed graph of N , denoted by G(N ) as follows:
-Between two different nodes M i , M j , there exists a directed edge M i M j if and only if there exists an accessibility relation in the action model T (N ), (s, i) a (t, j), for some s ∈ S i , a ∈ A, and t ∈ S j .
It is obvious that an S5 submodel of a K45 action model may be connected but not closed and vice versa. N 3 , s) . That is because G(N 3 ) is not a tree.
We showed that the graph of the basic learning actions are trees. The converse is also true, that is, for each K45 pointed action model (N, s), if its graph is a tree then it is associated to a basic learning program up to bisimilarity. Proposition 3.8 All S5 pointed action models are basic learning actions.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 3.9 If the graph of a finite K45 pointed model (N, s) is a finite tree, then (N, s) is a basic learning action.
Comparing two Learning Operators
In this part, we aim to compare our proposed learning operator with the learning operator introduced in [8] . We begin with the same example "Lecture or Amsterdam" discussed in [8] .
Anne and Bert are in a bar, sitting at a table. A messenger comes in and delivers a letter addressed to Anne. The letter contains either an invitation for a night out in Amsterdam or an obligation to give a lecture instead. Anne and Bert commonly know that these are the only alternatives.
Consider the following information change scenario:
• (spy-seeing). Bert says good bye to Anne and leaves the bar. During his leaving, he secretly spies from the window of the bar that whether Anne reads the letter, Anne does not get aware that Bert spies on her, and wrongly thinks that she is alone (Bert is not present) while she reads the letter.
Suppose that p stands for "Anna is invited for a night out in Amsterdam", and also assume that in fact p is true.
It is not possible to model the above information change scenario in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic [8] . But we can model above scenario by the following basic learning programs.
The pointed action model associated to the above learning program is (N, s) , where S = {s, t, v, u}, s a v, v a v, t a u, u a u, and s b s, s b t, t b s, t b t, and pre(s) = pre(v) = p, pre(t) = pre(u) = ¬p. A candidate to describe the action "spy-seeing" in formalization presented in [8] 
is not a well-formed action in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic since it does not satisfy definition 6 of [8] . In this definition if L B α is a well-formed action then gr(α) ⊆ B. Whereas, gr(L a ?p ∪ L a ?¬p) = {a}, and {a} ⊆ {b}. For another example, we discuss the following information change scenario:
• (spy-reading). Bert says good bye to Anne and leaves the bar. using a hidden camera, Bert spies on Anne when she reads the letter, and Bert gets aware of the contents of the letter using the camera. Anne wrongly thinks that she is alone, and there is no spy on her.
Again, it is not possible to model the above information change scenario in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic [8] . But we can model above scenario by the following basic learning programs L b (L a ?p).
The pointed action model associated to the above learning program is (N, s), where S = {s, t}, s b s, s a t, t a t, and pre(s) = pre(t) = p. Again note that the term L b (L a ?p) is not a well-formed action in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic as {a} ⊆ {b}.
We can also model scenarios introduced in [8] via basic learning programs as follows: 3-(mayread) Bert orders a drink at the bar so that Anne may have read the letter (and actually Anne reads the letter)
where -The pointed action model associated to α, denoted by (
The pointed action model associated to β, denoted by (N 3 , s 3 ), is S = {s 3 , t 3 , v 3 }, s 3 a t 3 , s 3 b v 3 , t 3 a t 3 , v 3 b v 3 , and pre(s 3 ) = pre(t 3 ) = pre(v 3 ) = .
One may easily check that for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (N i , s i ) is b-bisimilar to (N j , s j ). Also, for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (N i , s i ) is a-bisimilar to (N j , s j ) if and only if i = j.
Therefore, the action model associated to L ab (α, β, γ) is (N, 1), where S = {1, 2, 3}, 1 a 1, 2 a 2, 3 a 3, and 1 b 1, 2 b 2, 3 b 3, and 1 b 2, 2 b 3, 3 b 1, and pre(1) = p, pre(2) = ¬p, and pre(3) = .
4-(bothmayread). Bert orders a drink at the bar while Anne goes to the bathroom. Both may have read the letter (and actually both of them have read).
Four above information change scenarios are also modelled in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic in example 7, of [8] . Also, in Figure 1 of [8] , page 4, Epistemic states resulted from the execution of actions (for these scenarios) described in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic (example 7, of [8] ) is shown. It easy to verify that Epistemic states resulted from the execution of pointed action models associated to basic learning programs for these scenarios (introduced above) are exactly the same Epistemic states resulted from the execution actions described in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic [8] (and shown in Figure 1 of the same reference, in page 4).
Learning by Recursion
By learning by recursion, we mean the cases where agents learn about each other's learning, i.e., an agent a learns something about learning of another agent b and agent b also learns about learning of agent a. In this way, a recursive learning occurs. In this section, we introduce recursive learning actions to model this type of learning.
In the following definition, undf , indicates that the term is undefined. 
is a suitable substitution for α(X 1 , X 2 , ..., X k ), whenever α(β 1 , β 2 , ..., β k ) ∈ OpenT(Φ).
Now we define open action models, in order to be associated to open terms. For each variable X, let (N X , s X ) be a variable pointed action model, where N X = S X , ( X a ) a∈A , pre X and the set S X , the relations X a , and the function pre X are variables. The open action model of an open term α(X 1 , X 2 , ..., X k ) is simply constructed using variable pointed action models (N X 1 , s X 1 ), (N X 2 , s X 2 ), ..., and (N X k , s X k ) and Definition 3. Substitution of (M, t 0 ) for (N X , s X ) means to substitute t 0 for s X . Therefore, pre(s X ) = pre(t 0 ) = ϕ and Figure 11 . 
) is obtained by adding the new state (s X , 1) as the actual state and adding new accessibility relations (s X , 1) b (s X , 1), and (s X , 1) a t, for all t ∈ a[s X ]. We have pre((s X , 1)) = pre(s X ), and
, and adding new accessibility relations
Continuing the above scenario and using Definition 3.2, the open action model in Figure 11 is constructed.
To obtain the open action model of Figure 13 , the symbol s µ X will be defined in the next section). It is easy to verify that the pointed action model in Figure 13 is bisimilar to the pointed action model (N 3 , s) explained in Example 2.5 as a recursive learning action.
Recursive Learning Programs
One may check that the graph of the action model shown in Figure 3 is not a tree and thus by Theroem 3.6, it is not a basic learning action. So we cannot describe it in terms of alternative learning, L B (−, −, ..., −), concurrent learning ∩, and wrong learning, | B , operators. We add a new operator µ to the language for recursive learning and show that the action model shown in Figure 3 is a recursive learning action. To do this, we need to slightly modify the Definition of open terms 4.1 as follows. 
are defined, then µX 1 .α(X 1 , X 2 , ..., X k ) is an open term with k − 1 free variables; the variable X 1 is bound under µX 1 . We define group(µX.α(X 1 , X 2 , ..., X k )) = group(α(X 1 , X 2 , ..., X k )) and pre(µX.α(X 1 , X 2 , ..., X k )) = pre(α(X 1 , X 2 , ..., X k )).
A term α ∈ OT(Φ) is closed if it has no unbounded variable. 
is constructed in the following way. The model of the open term
is shown in Figure 14 . Figure 14 The model of the open term
is shown in Figure 15 . Figure 15 The action model of
is illustrated in Figure 16 . Figure 16 Finally the action model of the recursive learning program α is shown in Figure 17 . As two other examples, one may check that the action model associated to the recursive learning program
is the pointed action model illustrated in Figure 18 , Figure 18 and the action model associated to the recursive learning program
is bisimilar to the pointed action model (N, s) illustrated in Figure 19 . 
Two Main Theorems
In this subsection, we present two main theorems of the paper. In the first one, Theorem 4.12, we show that every finite K45 action model is associated to some recursive learning program and conversely, for every learning program, there is a finite K45 action model associated with it. Then we introduce a hierarchy over learning programs with respect to the number of recursive learning operators. In our second main Theorem 4.15, it is shown that the hierarchy of the learning programs is strict, i.e., it is not possible to describe all K45 action models by a determined finite number of recursion in learning. That means that the hierarchy does not collapse.
Representing Epistemic Action Models
Definition 4.9 Let N = S, ( a ) a∈A , pre be a K45 action model. For each agent a ∈ A, an a-component of N is M a = S , ( a ) a∈{a} , pre , where M a is an S5 closed connected submodel of N .
Assume for all
We construct the action model T (N ) = S , ( a ) a∈A , pre as follows: , (i, a) )) = pre i a (s).
The projection of an state (s, (i, a) ) in the action model T (N ), denoted by Π ((s, (i, a) )), is defined to be the state s in the action model N . Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.5.
Theorem 4.12 All finite epistemic actions are recursive learning programs, i.e.,
FAct(Φ) = RLP(Φ).
Proof. See the Appendix. 
A Hierarchy of Learning
Definition 4.14 For each k ∈ N, we define the class kRLP, of all finite K45 pointed action models which can be described by a recursive learning program with at most k times of dependent use of the recursive operator µ.
The term 'dependent' in the above definition is crucial. In a program, two operators µX and µY are called to be dependent if it is not possible to use one variable for both operators and achieve the same action model. For example, in the program,
the operators µX and µY are independent. Note that the program
describes the same action model. In contrast with the above example, in the following program,
the operators µX and µY are dependent. It is easy to observe that the class 0RLP is the class of all basic learning programs, BLP. We also wish to name 1RLP as the class of primitive recursive learning programs and denote it also by PRLP.
To prove the next theorem, we need to clarify some notions in graph theory. Let G = (N, E) be a directed graph. A simple loop L in the graph G is a sequence of nodes s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , ..., s n , such that for all i < n, (s i , s i+1 ) ∈ E, (s n , s 0 ) ∈ E, and for all 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n, if i = j then s i = s j . We call s 0 the start-point of the simple loop L. Let L = s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , ..., s n and L = s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , ..., s m be two simple loops. We say L is connected to L by its start-point, if there exists 0 ≤ t ≤ n, s t = s 0 and s t = s 0 , and for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n and 0 ≤ j ≤ m if i = t and j = 0, then 
Concluding Remarks and Further Work

Related Works
We may compare epistemic learning programs with other approaches, like concurrent dynamic epistemic logic [8] and epistemic programs [5] .
In concurrent dynamic epistemic logic [8] , an epistemic action is interpreted as a relation between S5 epistemic states and sets of S5 epistemic states. There are two main differences between the interpretation of epistemic action in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic and epistemic learning programs.
1. An epistemic action in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic is a relation between epistemic states whereas in epistemic learning programs, it is a function from epistemic states to epistemic states.
2. Concurrent dynamic epistemic logic is just about S5 models whereas epistemic learning programs also considers K45 models.
Another difference is in the interpretation of the notion of learning. Our learning operator is an operator on action models, and L B (α 1 , α 2 , ..., α k ) is a new action model, expressing the condition that agents in B learn that an action among α 1 , α 2 , ..., α k has occurred, whereas the action α 1 has actually occurred. For example, L b (?ϕ, ?ψ) is an action model which says:
ϕ is announced and agent b is suspicious whether he learns ϕ or learns ψ.
One may compare the above learning program with the action L b (!?ϕ∪?ψ) in dynamic epistemic logic, and observe that for all S5 epistemic state (M, s), we have that ?ψ) ) is equal to the learning program L b (?ϕ), whereas, in dynamic epistemic logic, the action L b (L b (!?ϕ∪?ψ)) is equal to L b (!?ϕ∪?ψ). Thus there is a difference between the notion of learning we consider for learning programs and the notion of learning considered in dynamic epistemic logic.
Despite of the above arguments, it seems possible to translate a class of action terms, say α, in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic to a recursive learning program tr(α), such that for all S5 epistemic state (M, s), we have that (M, s) × (N tr(α) , t tr(α) ) is bisimilar to
Another way to represent information change is via the notion of epistemic program introduced in [5] . Whereby the notion of action signature is introduced and by adding this notion to the propositional dynamic logic P DL [13, 3] , a logical language is obtained to represent information change. However in this setting, no learning operator is considered, and the information change is represented through action signature, alternative, sequential, and iteration compositions. We focus on different kinds of learning; as the primitive notion of information change is learning something by agents.
Another work related to ours is [10] where the epistemic programs are discussed by adding a parallel composition operator to non-deterministic sum and sequential composition.
We showed that all finite K45 action models can be described by recursive learning programs. It is also announced in [6] that every S5 action model can be described as a concurrent epistemic action.
We showed that K45 models are models of the belief KD45 logic for applicable formulas. In this way, to preserve the belief consistency of an agent, the agent is absent in the states that conflicts his beliefs. A similar work has been done in [16] , which assumes that a rational agent rejects those incoming information which dispute his beliefs.
By introducing K45 models and actions, we may think of a theory of multi-agent belief revision. A related work is [2] , which generalize AGM [1] , to a multi-agent belief revision theory.
Our work presents a method to construct K45 action models through some basic constructors. Also in [11] , it is introduced operators to compose epistemic models in order to construct large models by small components representing agents' partial observational information.
Further work
A functional Semantics
As a semantics of epistemic learning programs, we associated a pointed action model to every basic learning program. We may propose a functional semantics for the basic learning programs, in the manner that each program is associated to a partial function from epistemic states M od to M od. In this semantics, the meaning of learning operator is different form the meaning we discussed in the introduction. Here, learning in epistemic states (M, s) deals with two things, a set U of states of M . which includes the actual state s, and a set of agents B ⊆ A (where A refers to the set of all agents). Learning with B ⊆ A and U ⊆ S in the epistemic states (M, s) means that: agents in B become aware that the actual state is among the states in U , and other agents in A − B believe that nothing has occurred.
Let Φ be a set of epistemic formulas over a set of atomic formulas P and a set of agents A. To each α ∈ BLP (Φ), we associate a pair (f α , U α ), where f α : M od → M od is a partial function ,and for each epistemic state (M, s), U α ((M, s)) is a subset of S , where
For a recursive learning program µX.α(X), the associated partial function should satisfy the fixed point equation, i.e., f µX.α(X) = f α • f µX.α(X) . As our forthcoming work, we aim to study this functional semantics. It seems to us that functional semantics and recursive learning take us beyond the action models, that is, by functional semantics, epistemic learning programs can encodes information changes which cannot be encode by action models.
A Logic for RLP
We need to provide a proof system for RLP as it is done for other approaches, like concurrent dynamic epistemic logic [8] , and action models [4, 5] .
Notions of Learning
In Introduction, we put forward two meanings for 1. pointed action models (see 2.1) and 2. learning of an action model (see 2.2). We supposed that an action model describes what is announced and what agents perceive based on their accesses to the resource of announcement. We also assumed that the learning of an action by a set of agents is to learn about the way information change. So our meanings of action models and learning refer to the occurrence of information change.
We may propose two other meanings for pointed action models and learning of an action model, which refer to disability in information change. In this way, an action model describes the disability of agents in hearing or accessing the resource of announcement. For example, the new meaning of the pointed action model (N 1 , s) in Figure 1 , Figure 1 is "in the case of announcement of ϕ agent a hears ψ. " Note that the above meaning does not speak about what occurs in information change, but it just describes a disability of agent a. Suppose ϕ = green and ψ = blue. The new meaning of the pointed action model (N 1 , s) is that agent a has a color-blindness and if a green ball is shown to her then she thinks that she sees a blue ball. Similarly, the meaning of learning an action changes. The new meaning is learning about disability not about occurrence. The learning of an action by a set of agents is to learn about the disabilities that the agents have. Figure 22 shows two pointed action models where both refer to L a ((N 1 , s) ) (agent a learns the pointed action model (N 1 , s) ), but one considers the occurrence meaning and the other considers the disability meaning. In the occurrence meaning, agent a learns that ϕ is announced. In the disability meaning, agent a becomes aware of her color-blindness, and after this learning, if she sees a blue ball, she is suspicious whether it is green or blue.
Appendix
Lemma 6.1 Let M = S, ( a ) a∈A , V be a Kripke model such that for each a ∈ A, a is Euclidean. Then for all s ∈ S, if there is a state v ∈ S such that v a s then there exists t ∈ S such that s a t.
Proof. Let S be a set of states and ⊆ S × S be an Euclidean relation. Suppose s, v ∈ S are arbitrary and v s. By Euclidean property, we derive s s, and we are done.
Proof.3.5. Consider T (N ) = S , ( a ) a∈A , pre . Define R ⊆ S × S as follows. For all s ∈ S and w ∈ S , sRw if and only if Π(w) = s.
We show that R is a bisimulation relation. Suppose all different the maximal closed connected S5 submodels of N are M 1 , M 2 , ... and M k . Assume sRw. Then w = (s, i), for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
-Forth. Let s a t. Either a ∈ B i or a ∈ B i . In the first case, since M i is closed, we have t ∈ S i and thus (s, i) a (t, i), and since tR(t, i), we are done. In the second case, since N is a K45 model, and s a t, we have t a t, by Lemma 6.1. Therefore there exists a maximal closed connected S5 submodel of N , say M j , such that t ∈ S j and a ∈ B j . By Definition 3.4, (s, i) a (t, j), and since tR(t, j) we are done.
-Back. Suppose (s, i) a (t, j). Then by Definition 3.4, s a t, and we are done.
-Pre. It is straightforward.
Proof.3.6. The proof is by induction on the structure of basic learning programs. First of all, note that for each epistemic formula ϕ, the graph of the action model (N ?ϕ , s ?ϕ ) is a tree.
Let α be a basic learning program and its graph G(N α ) be a tree. We show that the graph G(N ψ| B α ) is a tree, for any arbitrary formula ψ and B ⊆ group(α). The maximal closed connected S5 submodels of the action model N ψ| B α are all the maximal closed connected S5 submodels of N α , say M 1 , M 2 , ..., M k , and the maximal closed connected S5 submodel containing the state s ψ| B α , which is M 0 = {s ψ| B α }, ( Let α 1 and α 2 be two basic learning programs such that group(α 1 ) ∩ group(α 2 ) = ∅, and pre(α 1 ) = pre(α 2 ) and G(N α 1 ) and G(N α 2 ) are trees. Then the graph G(N α 1 ∩α 2 ) is a tree for the following reasons. The maximal closed connected S5 submodels of N α 1 ∩α 2 consist of all the maximal closed connected S5 submodels of N α 1 , and all the maximal closed connected S5 submodels of N α 1 , and the maximal closed connected S5 submodel containing the state s α 1 ∩α 2 , which is M 0 = {s α 1 ∩α 2 }, ( 0 a ) a∈∅ , pre 0 (s α 1 ∩α 2 ) = pre(α 1 ) . One may check that, since group(α 1 ) ∩ group(α 2 ) = ∅, there is no edge between the nodes of the subtrees G(N α 1 ) and G(N α 2 ). So if the graphs G(N α 1 ) and G(N α 2 ) have no loop, the graph of G(N α 1 ∩α 2 ) would have no loop as well.
Assume α 1 , α 2 , ... and α m are basic learning programs such that their graphs have no loop. The the maximal closed connected S5 submodels of N L B (α 1 ,α 2 ,...,αm) are the followings:
1. the S5 model M 0 consists of m states (s α 1 , 1), (s α 2 , 1) , ..., (s αm , 1), with accessibility relations produced by agent-bisimilarity of group B (see Definition 3.2).
2. all the maximal closed connected S5 submodels of
The node M 0 is the root of the graph G(N L B (α 1 ,α 2 ,...,αm) ), and all the graphs G (N α 1 ) ,
..,αm) ), such that the root may be connected to them. Hence if
is a tree.
Proof.3.8. Suppose (N, s 0 ) is an S5 pointed action model. Let N = S, ( a ) a∈A , pre , where S = {s 0 , s 1 , ..., s k }, and A = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a m }. As the model is S5, all accessibility relations are equivalence relations. For each agent a i , let
i } be the equivalence classes of the relation a i , which partitions the set S. Consider n i epistemic formulas ψ i,1 , ψ i,2 , ..., ψ i,n i , where none of them are KD45 equivalent to each other. For each s j , 0 ≤ j ≤ k, consider the basic learning program α j α j = β j,1 ∩ β j,2 , ..., ∩β j,m , where each β j,l is a basic learning program defined as follows
where s j ∈ D h l . The action model associated to the basic learning program L A (α 0 , α 1 , α 2 , ..., α k ) is (N, s 0 ). Since for each agent a, the action models of two programs α j and α i are a-bisimilar if and only if s j and s i are in the same equivalence classes induced by the relation a .
graph in which the nodes are n 0 , n 1 , n 2 , ..., n k , and the edges are agents in A. To each node n i , we correspond a variable X i .
If the graph is a tree, then we are done and then we can construct a basic learning program describing (N, s 0 ) . If the graph is not a tree, we unwind it to an infinite tree with the root n 0 .
Figure 23
In the unwound infinite tree, there could be infinite nodes with the same name, say n i . For all nodes w of the unwound tree, if w is a node with name n i (for some i) and exactly one of its parents has the same name n i , then we cut the subtree rooted from w and change the name of w from n i to variable X i . In this way, a finite tree T (N ) is obtained. Now we are ready to construct the desired program. We start from down to the top of the finite tree T (N ). 2. Suppose that n j is the name of a node w in T (N ), which either all of its children are corresponded to a variable or a program. Two cases are possible:
-Case 1. Among the children of w there is no node corresponding to the variable with the same index j, that is X j . For this case, suppose n j refers to a b-component with the states v 1 , v 2 , ..., v m . For each state v l , and each agent a ∈ A, if there is a directed edge with label a starting from the state v l to a children of w, say u, in the tree T (N ), consider
where P a,l is a program or variable corresponding to the node u. Then we associate to the node w, the program The program corresponding to the root of the tree T (N ) is a recursive learning program which describes pointed action model (N, s 0 ).
Proof.4.15. In Theorem 3.6, it is proved that the graph of the action model of a basic learning program is a tree. So none of the operations: alternative learning, concurrent learning, wrong learning, produces any loops in the graph of a learning program. It is easily seen by Definition 4.7 that, the only operation that makes loops in the semantics of a learning program is the recursive learning operator. Therefore, if in a learning program, there exist k times of dependent use of the recursive operator µ, then there exists at most a k-nested loop in its graph. That is, for each k ∈ N, the graph of an action model associated to a program in kRLP has at most k-nested loops. For each k > 0, we introduce a learning program α k , such that its associated action model belongs to kRLP but not (k − 1)RLP.
, where ϕ is not logically equivalent to ψ. The associated action model of the learning program α 1 is the action model (N 3 , s) in Figure 3 . Since ϕ and ψ are not logically equivalent, the two states (N 3 , s) and (N 3 , t) (see Figure 3) are not bisimilar. If there exists a program β without any recursive operator that its associated action model is bisimlar to (N 3 , s) , then the action model N 3 would be bisimilar to a finite action model M ∈ F Act, such that its graph is a tree. Suppose R is a bisimilarity relation between N 3 and M , and sRs . Because of bisimilarity, since s a t, there exists an state t in model M , such that tRt and s a t . Again, since t b s, there exists an state s in M , such that sRs and t b s . The model M is a tree, so we have s = s , and as s and t are not bisimilar, we have s = t . Again, by bisimilarity, there exists an state t in M , such that s a t and tRt . The new state t is different from other states of M , since M has no loop. In this way, M is an infinite model, and we derive a contradiction.
• k = 2. The above argument can be done for k = 2, by considering the associated action model of the program α 2 = µX.L a (ϕ| b µY.L b (ψ| a X ∩ ψ| c L c (θ| b Y ))) (see Figure 17) , where none of the formulas ϕ, ψ and θ are logically equivalent. If there is a program β with at most one use of recursive operation, then the action model in Figure 17 (which has a 2-nested loop) would be bisimilar to an action model M , that its graph has just one loop. This can easily be shown, since none of the states of the action model in Figure 18 are bisimilar to each other, so the action model M cannot be finite.
